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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001699

SIPDIS

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TAGS: MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER MARR PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: U.S. WEAPONS RELEASE TO IRAQ

- 11. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 15.
- 12. (SBU) SUMMARY: We request the release of U.S. sensors and weapons (described in para 3-5) to the Government of Iraq (GOI) for incorporation onboard Iraqi Air Force (IAF) aircraft to advance the GOI's counter-terrorism capability and security self-sufficiency. The aircraft and the equipment will remain under U.S. operational control until the GOI and IAF meet key milestones in security and training readiness. The equipment will be procured primarily through a U.S. funded Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. The GOI and Coalition consider the equipment a force generation requirement. It will take twelve to twenty months lead time to develop, build, test and deploy these systems. END SUMMARY.

Description of Technology for Release

- 13. (SBU) Three IAF Counter-Terrorism Cessna 208B Caravans, under U.S. operational control, would be equipped with the following sensors and weapon systems: 1. Sensors: Mx-15 or MTS-A Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor (space-stabilized EO/IR sensor with laser range finder, laser illuminator, and laser designator). 2. Weapon Systems: 1553 NATO standard data bus, 2-4 hard points, and "Group A" wiring to support the laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire. Finally, the ISR data link system included on the Caravans will be upgraded to allow the aircraft to perform aircraft-to-aircraft image transfer.
- 14. (SBU) The IAF AT-6 or Super Tucano aircraft, under U.S. operational control, would be equipped with the following sensors and weapon systems: 1. Sensors: Mx-15 or MTS-A EO/IR sensor (space-stabilized EO /IR sensor with laser range finder, laser illuminator, and laser designator). 2. Weapon Systems: 1553 NATO standard data bus and 2-4 hard points to support laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire, 2.75-inch rockets, 250-500 lb ballistic and laser-guided bombs, and the ALE/AAR-47 defensive system.
- 15. (SBU) The IAF UH-1H Huey II CT platform, under U.S. operational control, would be equipped with the following sensors and weapon systems: 1. Sensors: Mx-15 or MTS-A EO/IR sensor (space-stabilized EO/IR sensor with laser range finder and laser illuminator but no laser designator). 2. Weapon systems: capability to support 2.75-inch rockets as well as a forward-firing gun not to exceed the caliber of guns already released to Iraqi ground forces. In addition, the ALE/AAR-47 defensive system currently installed on the original 16 UH-1H Huey II and C-130 aircraft is needed for aircraft survivability.

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16. (SBU) U.S. forces presently perform all airborne counter-terrorism missions; the GOI and IAF do not have adequate capability to find, track, target, and engage Anti-Iraq Forces (AIF). To successfully transition security responsibilities to the GoI, the IAF must be capable of engaging time-sensitive targets. U.S. Government purchase and release of technology described in para 2-4 for incorporation on U.S.-controlled Iraqi aircraft will enable the IAF to meet its need for organic airborne CT platforms. These systems are critical for support of Iraqi Special Operations Forces and other Iraqi CT forces, and both the Prime Minister and the Commanding General fully support such an increase in capability.

Technology to Remain Under U.S. Operational Control

- 17. (SBU) U.S. forces will rigorously track, maintain, and safeguard all sensitive munitions and technology released for deployment onboard the IAF aircraft. The GOI and IAF will only be permitted to retain a limited stock of sensitive weapons for their aircraft, and the US will provide just-in-time replacement of these weapons as they are needed for ongoing operations. Furthermore, IAF aircrew will not have autonomous control and authority to use airborne counter-terrorism weapons until they and their leadership have demonstrated the capability and intent to use them in a manner consistent with US human rights standards and the international laws of armed conflict.
- 18. (U) The GOI and IAF maturity will be measured by two key milestones: (1) the ability to properly secure and protect

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sensitive technology (through specific bilateral agreements as applicable) and (2) the ability to properly control, sustain, and operate sensitive technology (through ongoing Training Readiness Assessments). If the GOI and IAF do not eventually conform to agreed upon standards in either area, the technology will not be transferred to the GOI and IAF. Since the technology will be procured with Iraqi Security Force Funds, the US may ultimately decide to remove it from the Iraqis and redirect it for other purposes consistent with US national security objectives.

19. (U) We believe the IAF/GOI will continue to develop security protection skills before the arrival of these capabilities in early 2008. Airborne weapon system operators and pilots will continue to mentor and train the IAF in the proper use, protection, and safeguarding of these technologies until they demonstrate this maturity and intent.

Iraq Safeguarding Sensitive Technology

110. (U) The GOI has demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology through cooperation with U.S. and Coalition forces. The GOI's implementation of an Article 505 agreement (signed July 24, 2004) demonstrates Iraq's willingness and ability to protect grant defense articles and technology in a manner consistent with U.S. standards. MNF-I intends to continue to mentor the GOI in the protection of sensitive USG technology. The Country Team and MNF-I will obtain necessary formal agreements with the GOI and perform real-time assessments of the stability of the GOI before transferring ownership of any sensitive equipment, technology, or weapons. Lastly, we will continue to carry out robust end-use monitoring through the GOLDEN SENTRY program.

Anticipated Reaction From Neighboring Nations

reactions from neighboring nations. Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors distrust the Shia-dominated GOI, fearing a "Shia crescent" running from Iran to Lebanon. Although Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have received similar equipment, they are unlikely to see Iraqi possession as benign.

## Iraq's Political Importance to the Region

112. (SBU) A stable, democratically-elected Iraqi government, capable of protecting its people and sovereignty, and remaining at peace with its neighbors is one of the USG's highest priorities. The release and employment of the sensors and weaponry described in paras 3-5 will facilitate progress toward this goal, advancing the Iraqi armed forces ability to defend Iraq's borders, target illicit activity, and improve air traffic safety.

## Source of Financing and Economic Impact

113. (SBU) MNF-I intends to use U.S. funds appropriated for Iraq (Iraqi Security Force Funds or ISFF) to procure and equip Counter Terrorism aircraft for the IAF. The purchase will be done primarily through a Foreign Military Sales program. We believe that the GOI will be able to financially support the operational and maintenance costs of these technologies for the foreseeable future.

## Relevant Human Rights Considerations

114. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations that should preclude the release of this technology to the Iraqi military. GOI stability will be assessed prior to transitioning direct US oversight and/or transferring ownership.

## Action Request

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 $\P$ 15. (SBU) We request Washington approval for the release to the GOI of items and technology described in paras 3-5. CROCKER